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COMMENT
RANDALL KENNEDY*
I agree with Mr. Rowan that Justice Thurgood Marshall's now
famous remarks on the bicentennial observance of the United States
Constitution' provided a necessary critique of the uncritical celebra-
tion. Although one might have thought that much of what the Jus-
tice noted would be familiar, and even banal, to anyone moderately
knowledgeable about American history, the expressions of dismay
triggered by his comments suggest that public education about the
Nation's past is urgently needed. It should be noted, moreover, that
neitherJustice Marshall's speech nor the controversy surrounding it
have drawn any attention to what blacks in pre-Civil War America
thought about the handiwork of the founding fathers.
Justice Marshall and Mr. Rowan suggest by implication that, ab-
sent the Civil War Amendments, they would be unwilling to pledge
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States. Their words dis-
play an unflinching repudiation of the constitutional regime that ex-
isted prior to 1865. The logic of that position is easy to understand.
After all, the legal systems of most states and the federal govern-
ment radically negated equality for black people in antebellum
America. 2 Most were slaves; even so-called "free" blacks were sub-
ject, in both the North and South, to many restrictions. In several
states blacks were not allowed to testify in cases in which a white
person was a party.3 Almost all excluded blacks from sitting on ju-
ries.4 Many excluded blacks from the franchise. 5 Some passed laws
or enacted constitutional amendments forbidding blacks to enter
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their territory.6 And Arkansas, just before the Civil War, passed a
law directing its "free" black residents to leave within a year or risk
enslavement.
7
Against this backdrop, consider the following statement made
in the opening editorial of the first black newspaper in the United
States. Writing in 1827, the editors of Freedom 'sJournal declared that
"in our discussion of political subjects we shall ever regard the Con-
stitution of the United States as our political star."' Or consider
this statement made by a noted black abolitionist in 1851 at the
State Convention of Ohio Negroes. Engaged in a debate over the
stance blacks ought to adopt toward the federal constitution, Wil-
liam Howard Day declared:
[C]oming as I do, in the midst of three millions of men in
chains, and five hundred thousand only half free, I consider
every instrument precious that guarantees to me liberty. I
consider the Constitution the foundation of American lib-
erties, and wrapping myself in the flag of the nation, I ...
plant myself upon the Constitution ... and appeal to the
American people for the rights thus guaranteed. 9
Other voices expressed contrary views. Addressing a meeting
of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1847, Frederick Douglass
maintained:
I have no patriotism. I have no country. . . . The only
thing that links me to this land is my family, and the painful
consciousness that here there are three millions of my fel-
low creatures, groaning beneath the iron rod of the worst
despotism ever devised.... I cannot have any love for this
country or for its Constitution. I desire to see it over-
thrown as speedily as possible, and its Constitution
shivered in a thousand fragments.'
Other blacks were equally frustrated and discouraged. Some
were so convinced that the United States was destined to remain a
"white man's country" that they migrated to Canada, England, the
6. Id. at 72-74.
7. I. BERLIN, supra note 2, at 372-74.
8. See R. DICK, BLACK PROTEST: ISSUES AND TACTICS 44 (1974).
9. See I A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 318
(H. Aptheker ed. 1951).
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ument. For a useful discussion of the evolution of Douglass' thinking on this issue, see
W. MARTIN, THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 18-54 (1984).
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Carribean, and various countries in Africa."
Most of those who could have left, however, chose not to do so.
They remained, urged fellow blacks to stay in the United States, and
deliberately pledged allegiance to the Constitution even though the
Supreme Court consistently interpreted it in a proslavery fashion.' 2
Why did they embrace the Constitution? The principal reason was
pragmatic: constitutionalism was and is America's civil religion.'"
Most black abolitionists sought to prevent their enemies from com-
pletely mastering the document's influential symbolism. One of
their primary means of struggle was an activity that has recently
emerged from academic obscurity to become front page news: the
practice of constitutional interpretation.
Black abolitionists, inspired in large part by ideas pioneered by
white allies," became heroic readers who transformed the Constitu-
tion into a platform more hospitable to their needs, a platform far
more decent than that created by the antebellum Supreme Court. A
brief mention of two of the ways in which they sought to make the
Constitution their own will illustrate the essential nature of their en-
terprise and the ironic ways in which it resonates with issues rele-
vant to the controversies of our own moment.
First, a principal tenet of black abolitionists who sought to use
the Constitution against slavery was that the document should be
strictly construed. Just as strict constructionism is now the rallying
cry of the conservative movement, so too was strict constructionism
the rallying cry of at least some abolitionist radicals. They insisted
upon a literal reading because the bare language of the founders'
Constitution made no mention either of slavery or of the color line.
The document states that "We the People"-not "We the white
male people"-but simply "We the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure do-
mestic Tranquility ... promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America."' 5
Second, black antislavery constitutionalists, refusing to consider
the original intent of the framers, construed in innovative ways vari-
1I. See generally S. MILLER, THE SEARCH FOR A BLACK NATIONALITY: BLACK IMMIGRA-
TION AND COLORIZATION, 1787-1863 (1975).
12. See generally D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 2.
13. See generally Levinson, "'The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT.
REV. 123.
14. See generally W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
15. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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ous clauses conventionally described as proslavery. As traditionally
understood, article I, section 2 of the Constitution 6 represented a
compromise under which the slave states were able to count their
slaves as part of the population for purposes of political representa-
tion.' 7 Interpreting the infamous three-fifths clause in a fashion
Walt Whitman would have appreciated, Is antislavery constitutional-
ists maintained that the clause was abolitionist in nature because it
comprised
a downright disability laid upon the slaveholding states,
one which deprives those states of two fifths of their natural
basis of representation. A black man in a free state is worth
just two fifths more than a black man in a slave state....
Therefore instead of encouraging slavery, [this clause of
the Constitution] encouraged freedom.' 9
Similarly, article I, section 8, clause 15 of the Constitution has
been viewed as proslavery in intent.2" It provides that Congress
shall have power to call forth the militia to suppress insurrections,
including, of course, slave uprisings. Antislavery constitutionalists
suggested, however, that this language could be read to endow Con-
gress with the power to eradicate the evil that gave rise to slave in-
surrections: slavery itself.
Some may see these novel interpretations as strategems entitled
to nothing more than recognition for their cleverness. I suggest,
however, that holders of that view consider the long line of in-
stances in which heroic, counter-intuitive interpretations have
served the Nation well. After all, the antislavery reading of the
three-fifths clause was no more improbable than the unprecedent-
edly expansive reading that the Supreme Court began to give to the
16. The section specifically states that representation in the House of Representa-
tives shall be based on the number of free persons in a state and "three fifths of all other
Persons."
17. See, e.g., S. LYND, The Abolitionist Critique of the United States Constitution, in CLAss
CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 153 (1967); D. ROBINSON,
SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 201 (1971) (the three-
fifths clause "acknowledged slavery and rewarded slaveholders").
18. See W. WHITMAN, Democratic Vistas, in WALT WHITMAN: POETRY AND PROSE 992
(Library of Am. ed. 1982) ("[Tjhe process of reading is not a half-sleep, but, in highest
sense, an exercise, a gymnast's struggle.").
19. F. Douglass, Speech at Glasgow, Scotland (March 26, 1860), reprinted in 2 THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (P. Foner ed. 1950).
20. See S. LYND, snpra note 17. BIti see D. ROBINSON, snpra note 17, at 218 (suggesting
that framers' concern was not with slave uprisings but rather with uprisings by dissident
whites).
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interstate commerce clause during the New Deal era.2' What makes
the abolitionist interpretation seem so unorthodox is that it failed to
obtain authoritative validation through conventional legal channels.
Thus, it failed to socialize succeeding generations into accepting it.
The antebellum blacks who pledged allegiance to the founders'
Constitution perceived the essential point that words do not speak
for themselves. They realized the importance of interpretation.
They revelled in the plasticity of language. They refused to be in-
timidated by those who insisted that constitutional provisions can
have only one possible interpretation. They understood that the
Constitution is as decent or indecent, as progressive or reactionary
as "We the People" make it.
21. Compare Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (no con-
gressional authority under commerce clause to regulate intrastate poultry slaughtering)
with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 1 1 (1942) (congressional authority under commerce
clause to regulate wheat grown by farmer to feed own family).
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